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In a 1926 review of  Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica, the logician Harry 
Sheffer argues, “the attempt to formulate the foundations of logic is rendered arduous by 
a...‘logocentric’ predicament. In order to give an account of logic, we must presuppose and 
employ logic” (228). The logocentric predicament has spilled very little ink when compared to 
its older sibling, Hume’s problem of induction. The major reason for this seems to be that most 
philosophers simply assume that deductive inferences are prima facie justified. For example, 
Peter Lipton has written that inductive inferences are “underdetermined by evidence and the 
rules of deduction…”, while valid deductive arguments are “perfect truth conduit[s]” and their 
justification is achieved simply by “show[ing] that arguments we judge valid are in fact so” 
(392). In this paper I will argue that the philosophers have wrongly assumed that there is an 
asymmetry between the problem of induction and the logocentric predicament, and that the 
exposure of this symmetry will reveal that skepticism is unavoidable when demanding 
justification for the structure of reasoning. Using a Wittgensteinian approach, I will argue that 
justification has an internal relation with deductive and inductive inferences. Separating the 
concepts so that one can be applied to the other is, then, a misunderstanding of the role that these 
words play within scientific reasoning. 
 
1. Induction 
 
Karl Popper defines inductive inferences as ones that pass “from singular statements…such 
as accounts of the results of observations or experiments, to universal statements, such as 
hypothesis or theories” (406).  But the finite capabilities of the observer means that there is 
always the possibility of an exception that the observer has failed to perceive.  If one has never 
seen an albino raven, then the inference that all ravens are black will move from true particular 
observations to a false generalized conclusion. Popper argues that justification for induction will 
have to be found either through analytic statements or synthetic statements. Popper’s reason for 
denying justification through analyticity is that such a justification would have to be formulated 
in purely logical terms, collapsing induction into a form of deduction. He writes, “the principle 
of induction must be a synthetic statement; that is a statement whose negation is not self-
contradictory but logically possible” (407). But valid deductive arguments preserve truth, which 
means that a deductive proof for induction would end up showing a relation between the 
premises and the conclusion that always holds. Since synthetic statements are particular 
observations, using them to prove a universal statement would be an inductive form of inference, 
thereby justifying induction by induction. This leads inevitably to an infinite regress, since every 
inductive principle would require a further principle of induction.  
 
Popper deals with the problem of induction by arguing that science is actually a deductive 
process. He argues that testable predictions can be derived from a hypothesis. The derived 
predictions are then compared with the results of scientific experiments and if the predictions are 
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shown to be false, “their falsification also falsifies the theory from which they were logically 
deduced” (411). If the process does not show the predictions to be false, then one can say that 
they have “proved [their] mettle”, or that they are “corroborated” (411). A theory or hypothesis 
is never actually proven to be true; it is only shown to not be false. For Popper, this solves the 
problem of induction because he has removed the need for an unjustified form of inference from 
the scientific method. Popper’s proposal turns entirely on the assumption that deductive 
inferences do not face the same justificatory problems that are faced by induction.     
 
2. The Logocentric Predicament 
 
But deduction does have problems that are symmetrical to those faced by induction. 
Wittgenstein noticed this problem in both Russell’s and Frege’s works, pointing out in the 
Tractatus: 
  
If p follows from q, I can conclude from q to p ; infer p from q.  
The method of inference is to be understood from the two propositions alone. 
Only they themselves can justify the inference. 
Laws of inference, which – as in Frege and Russell – are to justify the 
conclusions, are senseless and would be superfluous (§ 5.132). 
 
Ricketts argues that this passage is similar to Lewis Carroll’s skepticism in his paper “What the 
Tortoise Said to Achilles” (11-12). Carroll imagines a dialogue between the tortoise and Achilles 
in which Achilles tries to convince the tortoise that Modus Ponens is a valid argument. The 
tortoise accepts that the premises are true and that the conclusion follows if the premises are 
accepted as true, but then refuses to accept the conclusion. Achilles’ answer to this infuriating 
dilemma is to introduce an inference rule as a premise itself. The new premise says that the 
tortoise has to accept the conclusion if he accepts the premises and accepts that the conclusion 
follows from the premises. The tortoise is able to maintain his skepticism even in the face of the 
new premise by demanding a further premise for the justification of the new inference. This 
leads the bewildered Achilles into an infinite multiplication of premises, since for each new 
inference the tortoise is able demand another premise. If this is the type of dilemma that 
Wittgenstein is referring to, then one would expect that Frege and Russell have made the same 
mistake as Achilles.  
 
Ian Proops argues that one would have to read Frege and Russell uncharitably to find this 
mistake in their work, especially since they were both aware of Carroll style problems and 
explicitly avoided them. Proops points to a passage in the Principia Mathematica in which 
Russell writes:  
 
The principle of deduction gives the general rule according to which the 
inference is made, but is not itself a premise in the inference. If we treated it as 
a premise, we should need either it or some other general rule to enable us to 
infer the desired conclusion, and thus we should gradually acquire an 
increasing accumulation of premises without ever being able to make any 
inference... (Russell and Whitehead qtd. in Proops 285). 
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Russell is referring to tortoise style problems and then avoids them by giving inference rules the 
“status of informal principles that are employed in making inferences but not recorded as lines in 
the proofs” (Proops 286). Carroll is often viewed as failing to notice the difference between 
inference rules and suppressed premises (Smiley 727). Proops and Smiley both argue that these 
early incarnations of the logocentric predicament are easily dissolved once this distinction has 
been made. Smiley argues that inference rules, unlike suppressed premises, exist in an external 
relationship to the structure of arguments, meaning that the original structure of the argument 
does not have to change in order to justify the inference (731). Inference rules can be interpreted 
as kind of general permission that exists in the metalanguage instead of the object language 
(Hanna 57). Once Achilles is able to point out this distinction, the Tortoise will be unable to get 
his infinite regress going. To demand a further premise that asserts the validity of the previous 
inference means that the tortoise has failed to understand that validity is generated by following 
rules, not by hidden premises.  
 
This critique of Carroll’s paper has a certain amount of initial appeal, but it is hard not to 
feel as if this interpretation has failed to understand the full weight of the problem. While 
metalogic may be able to remove the problem from the object language, it is not clear how a 
similar problem will not arise in the metalanguage. Quine points out that if logic is to come from 
generalized conventions, the “derivation of the truth of any specific statement from the general 
convention thus requires a logical inference, and this involves us in an infinite regress...” (103). 
In other words, moving from general conventions or rules to particular instances requires or 
presupposes a further logic that must also come from further conventions or rules and so on. This 
means that the deductive move from generalised rules to particular instances invites just as much 
skepticism as the inductive move from particular instances to generalised rules. Smiley’s 
solution also invites skepticism about rule following in a manner that is similar to Kripke’s 
reading of the later Wittgenstein. Kripke points out that while rules may be general, one can only 
ever apply them to a finite number of cases and therefore one can never really know if the rule 
one thought they or another was following only applied to the past cases and not to future ones 
(Hymers 2010, 132). For example, a student could have thought they were following the rule +2, 
but when exposed to an extremely large number they discover that they are actually following 
the rule +2 only until a certain number is reached - at that point, the rule becomes +4. In the case 
of general logical rules, one may think that one is following a certain metalogical rule. But when 
faced with a particular instance, one may find that one is following something quite different 
than initially perceived. If there is an infinite amount of cases to which a general rule can be 
applied, and the rule can only be read off a finite amount of previous applications, then Kripke 
has argued that there is no way to know what rule is actually being followed (Hymers 2010, 
132). By taking Russell’s suggestion and creating a hierarchy of languages, we have just allowed 
tortoises to multiply. 
 
3. Is Wittgenstein a Tortoise? 
 
Instead of interpreting Wittgenstein’s remarks on inference as a tortoise style critique, there 
is good reason to see Wittgenstein waving away unnecessary conceptual machinery. In other 
words, Wittgenstein is pointing out that both Frege and Russell have spent a lot of time guarding 
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against problems that do not exist. In examining the nature of logical relations, Wittgenstein 
writes that if God “creates a world in which certain propositions are true, he creates thereby also 
a world in which all propositions consequent on them are true” (§5.132) While this line and the 
ones following it could be interpreted as Wittgenstein arguing that even God cannot escape logic, 
Wittgenstein’s main point is that logical relations are internal to the propositions themselves. He 
writes that a “proposition asserts every proposition which follows from it” (§5.124), meaning 
that a logical relation is not something that is separate from the proposition itself. In other words, 
logical relations are a part of the structure of the proposition. If it is not obvious that one 
proposition follows from another, then it is a failure of the symbolism. The logician’s job is to 
symbolize the structure of propositions as perspicuously as possible. If one proposition follows 
from another, this relation does not come about by being connected in another proposition; 
rather,“these relations are internal, and exist as soon as, and by the very fact that the propositions 
exist” (§5.131).  
 
For Wittgenstein, “a property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object does not possess 
it” (§4.123). Internal relations are similar: a relation is internal if it is unthinkable that this 
relationship does not hold. He uses the example of two shades of blue, one brighter and one 
darker than the other. The two shades exist in an internal relationship with each other because 
their very identity is at least partly composed of the relation in which they stand (Hymers 1996, 
593). Part of the identity of the shade dark blue is parasitic on lighter shades of blue and vice 
versa. This relation does not exist because one has held up two shades of blue beside each other; 
instead the relation is a part of the structure of each. In other words, God could not create a world 
with  lighter and darker shades of blue whose identity - of being lighter or darker - was 
independent of the relation between those shades of blue. In logic, if p follows from q, then it is 
unthinkable that they do not stand in the relation. If q is true, then everything that follows from q 
must also be true: the structure of the propositions means that even God cannot deny this fact.  
 
This means that the fault might not be with the tortoise for denying the logical inference, 
but with Achilles or the logician, for not creating a notation that is perspicuous enough to lay 
bare the structure of the propositions. If they had, the tortoise would have to cover his ears in 
order to continue denying the logical inference. Wittgenstein writes, “the proposition shows its 
sense. The proposition shows how things stand, if it is true. And it says, that they do so stand” 
(§4.022). Achilles has made the mistake of thinking that he can say what the inference rule is, he 
thinks that by adding a further premise it is possible to force the tortoise into accepting the 
conclusion if he accepts the premises. The mistake is not that Achilles could have avoided the 
infinite regress if he presented his inference rule as a metalogical rule instead of a premise within 
the object language; the mistake is to think that he could say anything about the rule. The rule 
needs to  be shown, and what needs showing is in the propositions themselves, not in an external 
logical structure. Wittgenstein thinks that if the internal structure can be properly shown through 
some logical notation, the tortoise would have to also deny reality in order to continue denying 
the inference. In § 4.023 Wittgenstein writes that while descriptions are about the external 
features of an object, “propositions describe reality by its internal properties.” Propositions are 
able to represent the world because they share a logical structure with the world, so when the 
logical structure of the proposition is exposed, the logical structure of the world is also exposed. 
5 
 
Therefore, the tortoise’s denial becomes a different type of skepticism, one that is similar to 
traditional Cartesian skepticism. 
 
4. Language Games and Tortoises 
 
While Wittgenstein does provide the tools to the answer the tortoise in the Tractatus, it still 
might not seem very persuasive, mostly because there are few philosophers who find the 
metaphysics of the Tractatus all that compelling, including the later Wittgenstein himself. But 
Wittgenstein’s answer to the tortoise is actually strengthened once the metaphysics of the 
Tractatus are left behind. The idea of internal relations survives Wittgenstein’s move to language 
games and exists in their grammar (the structure). For the later Wittgenstein, the meaning of a 
word is no longer determined by the logical relation it shares with reality but by “its use in the 
language” (2009, §43). Two concepts are internally related if “in order to understand one I must 
also understand the other” (Hymers 1996, 597). If we are teaching concepts to a child, and the 
only way for the child to understand the meaning of one concept is to also teach them another 
concept, then we can say that those concepts are internally related. Wittgenstein once again uses 
colours as an example. He notes that when one says “white is lighter than black” it seems like it 
is expressing something about the essence of the two colours...” (1972, §105). But this does not 
make very much sense because essence makes one think that there is something “inside” or in 
the “constitution” of a thing; it is hard to imagine what it would mean for there to be something 
inside black. This leads Wittgenstein to ask “Whom do we tell ‘White is lighter than black’? 
What information does it give?” (§105). The idea that “white is lighter than black” seems to be 
already given if one understands the concepts in the proposition. This shows that white and black 
are internally related. If one uses the words ‘white’ and ‘black’ without understanding this 
relation between them, then it is unlikely that one will be able to use these words in a 
communicative or non-confused way. The process of justification has an internal relationship 
with deductive and inductive inference rules. Wittgenstein notes that it is tempting to try to 
justify the “rules of grammar” by saying, “But there really are four primary colours” (1967, 
§331). The assertion of this fact, however, cannot justify: the colour words one uses, that some 
are primary and others are not, the number of colours that are primary, or even that one has 
divided up the world in such a way. Any attempt to do so will use the very rules and structures 
one is trying to justify (O’Neill 8). We are now in a position to diagnose why the justification of 
deduction and induction has been such an abysmal failure.  
 
Deductive and inductive inferences play an internal role in the process of justification: in 
order to understand justification, one must (at least, implicitly) understand the processes of 
deduction and induction and vice versa. This internal relationship is clear when one tries to 
imagine what justificatory practices would look like without deduction or induction, or when one 
tries to imagine explaining deduction to someone who has no understanding of the concept of 
justification. Wittgenstein’s early idea of a relation being internal if it is unthinkable that the 
relation does not hold is also relevant – these scenarios are unimaginable.  
 
Since the process of deduction is internal to the practice of justification, to ask for its 
justification is ultimately confused. From this perspective, it makes complete sense that trying to 
justify deduction through deduction does not work. Like the grammar of colours, the process has 
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to presuppose itself if one attempts to justify it in this way. Induction fails to justify deduction 
because this is an attempt to step outside the language game of justification itself. A justification 
for deduction by induction seems to cannibalize deduction. An inductive proof for deduction can 
only ever say: Since every valid deductive inference from true premises used thus far has also 
had a true conclusion, the relation between the premises and the conclusion will probably 
continue to hold. Deductive proofs can only be, at best, inductively true. But such a ‘proof’ 
seems to make every deductive inference just a form of induction.  
 
O`Neill writes that using a different conceptual grammar to the grammar that one is trying 
to justify cannot work, because the “justification will employ concepts different from our own, 
and will thereby be irrelevant to the justification of our grammar”, and since the “rules of 
grammar determine meaning...the employment of a different conceptual grammar will involve 
the use of different concepts” (8). While induction and deduction are both internal to justificatory 
practices, they are different concepts, and therefore they play different roles in the process of 
justification. Using one to justify the other is the attempt to use something completely irrelevant 
to its justification. An inductive proof cannot justify deduction, instead it can only show itself. 
The fact that deduction and induction are internal to justificatory language games does not make 
them prima facie justified. Instead, this relation points out the way in which the tortoise’s 
demand is inappropriate— he is asking Achilles to do something unthinkable. The later 
Wittgenstein does not give a solution to the logocentric predicament. Instead, Wittgenstein offers 
a therapeutic approach, whose aim is to dissolve the problem by utilizing the tools of internal 
relations, grammar, and language games. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have argued that Wittgenstein’s understanding of internal relations is central 
to both his early and later responses to the logocentric predicament. In the Tractatus he asserted 
that internal relations are those in which it would be unthinkable if the relation did not hold and 
that those relations are a part of the propositions themselves. In his later work, Wittgenstein’s 
understanding of internal relations changes slightly, as he sees an internal relation as holding if, 
and only if, in order to understand one concept, one must understand another. I have argued that 
an internal relation holds between the concept of justification and the concepts of deduction and 
induction. Both Popper and the tortoise’s request for a justificatory inference rules is ultimately 
confused. 
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